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exhortation has so far failed to achieve. It should also have the effect of 
transferring balance of payments surpluses (and real incomes) from countries like 
Japan and West Germany to the OPEC countries. 
Japan's chronic export surplus has undoubtedly been one of the destabilising 
features of the world economy in the past decade, compelling her trading partners, 
if they are unwilling or unable to run a corresponding deficit, to choose between 
domestic deflation or trade restrictions. However, Japan's current account 
surplus of $12 billion in fiscal year 1978 is expected to be only around $6 billion 
in fiscal year 1979, while some forecasters go so far as to suggest that Japan's 
current balance will move into deficit this year. Despite oil price increases.the 
rate of inflation in Japan should still not exceed last year's figure of 4.5%, 
while GDP growth is expected to fall to around 4% in real terms. 
West Germany is the only major industrial country, other than Italy, where the 
growth of GDP in 1979 is expected to be higher than in 1978. However, the rate of 
inflation is likely to rise to about 3.5%, with a slight fall in unemployment. 
In the United States, the rising cost of fuel has helped to accelerate the fall in 
car and truck sales which is a key indicator of the long-awaited mini-recession. 
Whereas there was real GNP growth of just 0.8% in the first quarter of this year, 
preliminary official estimates suggest that, in the second quarter, real 
GNP fell by 2% at an annual rate. More seriously, perhaps, retail prices rose at 
an annual rate of 13.5% in the first five months of the year. It therefore seems 
likely that during 1979 the consumer price index will move into double figures, and 
the real growth rate of GNP will drop from the 4% in 1978 to 2% in 1979. 
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The 'Tokyo Summit' meeting of the heads of government of the seven major industria-
lised countries which took place at the end of last month was encouraging in that 
a constructive response was agreed to the oil price increase. In particular, the 
closing communique publicly set its face against protectionism. The other danger 
which faces world trade in the next two years, is that the US may try to eliminate 
its external trade deficit by the deflation of domestic demand at a time when 
other industrialised countries, notably West Germany, Japan and the UK, are also 
deflating. To avoid this prospect it has been suggested that trade surpluses and 
deficits could be redistributed,by the introduction of positive discrimination, 
into tariff and other international trade policies. Specifically, it has been 
suggested that the rich countries should discriminate in favour of manufactured 
exports from the non-oil poorer countries, and against manufactured exports from 
Japan. Whatever the merits of this proposal from a purely economic standpoint, 
it is naive to suppose that it would be anything but politically divisive. 
The principal hope of obtaining all-round international agreement still lies with 
the negotiations under the auspices of GATT, now drawing to a close at Geneva. 
Multilateral reductions of tariffs on manufactured goods were agreed in principle 
last April, though there still remains disagreement over the phasing of the 
reductions over the eight years from 1980. 
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The UK 
Economy 
of policy 
neverthel 
perverse. 
The UK economy continues to be depressed 
and is likely to remain so over the 
coming year. Preliminary estimates 
suggest that GDP fell in both the final 
quarter of 1978 and the first of 1979, 
and this pattern is likely to have per-
sisted into the second quarter of this 
year. Indicators in the early months 
of 1979 were distorted by widespread 
industrial action, accounting in part 
for the 1% drop in GDP during the first 
quarter^ However, though industrial 
production subsequently recovered 
rapidly, the level for the quarter as a 
whole remained below the average 1978 
level, suggesting a zero or even negative 
underlying rate of growth. Recent falls 
in registered unemployment are therefore 
unlikely to be maintained and will 
probably be reversed given the conjunc-
tion of deflationary forces which the 
UK economy faces. 
The recent changes in economic policy, 
' namely the shift from direct to indirect 
taxation and the planned reduction in 
the size of the public sector, are 
likely to further depress the level of 
activity in the short run. However 
desirable or overdue such a recasting 
may have been, and however successful their long run consequences.it 
ess appears that the short run effects, both direct and indirect, may be 
The factors tending to depress the level of activity over the coming year are firstly 
budgetary and domestic factors, and secondly the exogenous rise in energy prices. 
Consider each of these in turn. The tax changes in the budget imply a mild 
stimulus to activity for the remainder of this year. The direct tax changes 
involve an injection of £3.6 billion into the economy, while the indirect tax 
measures withdraw £2.4 billion. This net injection results primarily from the 
backdating of the direct tax changes to the beginning of the financial year, while 
the indirect tax measures only take effect from mid-June. (Over a full year 
however the net effect of the measures would be deflationary). The stimulus to 
activity from these fiscal manoeuvres will be offset by the public expenditure cuts 
of £1.6 billion, while the effects of cash limits are expected to reduce planned 
programmes by a further £1 billion in 1979-80. Such are the direct effects of the 
budget. 
The indirect effects are also of importance and also deflationary. The VAT charges 
are expected to add 4-4J% to the Retail Price Index. The twelve monthly rate of 
price inflation at the onset of the next pay round in August will therefore be at 
least 15%; not only high but also rising. The effect on wage expectations and 
demands is obvious. Such demands will be made in the context of an avowedly 
inflexible monetary policy. The approach currently being taken to curb the rate 
of growth of the broad money supply (M„) at present necessitates an MLR of 14%. 
Maintenance of such a high level of interest rates helps to inflate the exchange 
rate, thereby reducing export profitability and increasing import penetration, 
effects which are only to a small extent offset by the beneficial effect on the 
rate of price inflation. Given the current rate of return on capital, MLR of 14% 
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is unlikely to encourage inyestment in productive assets, while for many house-
buyers the associated rise in mortgage interest rates may,at the turn of the year, 
completely absorb the effects of the direct tax changes introduced in the budget. 
Attempts by local authorities to recover the shortfall in the Rate Support Grant 
by poundage increases will further reinforce this effect. 
External factors are also unfavourable. The OPEC inspired rise in energy prices, 
given the inelasticity of demand for such products, will depress the real level of 
non-energy final demand in both the UK and its trading partners. The volume of 
world trade is therefore unlikely to be buoyant over the coming year. The UK's 
role as an important oil producer and exporter confers upon it an advantage not 
shared by our trading partners as the price of UK oil exports rises in line with 
those of OPEC. This advantage may be offset by the resulting strength of sterling 
and consequential reductions in exports. 
All components of final demand would therefore appear weak over the coming year. 
Little growth is likely in consumer's expenditure as real incomes contract. 
Furthermore, the higher perceived rate of inflation may lead to a rise in the 
savings ratio in an attempt to reconstitute real balances. Central government 
expenditure is likely to fall marginally, while capital investment may also 
contract in the face of weak domestic and export demand. The budget forecasts 
suggest that GDP will fall by 1% between mid 1979 and mid 1980. 
Given the current sterling effective exchange rate, demand conditions in export 
markets and the rising trend of price inflation, the number of unemployed in the 
UK will rise significantly over the coming year regardless of the level of wage 
settlements. The level of such settlements will however determine the length of 
time during which this higher level of unemployment will persist. Wage settle-
ments consistent with the current stance of monetary policy imply a short run fall 
in real incomes, with consequent downward pressure on the derived demand for 
labour. Wage settlements inconsistent with the 7-11% rate of growth of M„ can 
only be accommodated by a reduction in the level of employment. Under both 
scenarios the level of unemployment rises. Under the first however, the UK is 
reasonably placed to participate in the future recovery of the world economy. 
The second, by contrast, merely postpones the required adjustment, and represents 
a repetition of the UK experience of 1974-76. This second scenario, oft repeated 
in the UK, invariably degenerates into an incomes policy, while on past perfor-
mance the first can only be attained by means of such a policy. 
It will be interesting to observe how long the government can maintain their 
resolve to avoid the introduction of incomes policy. 
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